

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.191
18 June 1964
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Miss L. de VINCENZI

Mr. E. HCSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELIV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.H. TAIT

Mr. C.F. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. FECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. B.K. HERRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. KAKENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. CUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. Manuel TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. El ERIAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to welcome back to the Conference Mr. R.K. Nehru, who is with us once again as leader of the Indian delegation.

Before calling upon the speakers today, I should like to read to you a recommendation from the co-Chairmen concerning our procedure of work in regard to collateral measures:

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Committee that, in considering measures aimed at reducing the armaments race and at lessening international tensions, it establish the following schedule for the next five weeks:

18 June - General discussion;

25 June - Reduction of military budgets (suggested for discussion by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (suggested for discussion by the United States delegation);

2 July - Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons (suggested for discussion jointly by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union);

9 July - A topic to be suggested for discussion by the United States delegation;

16 July - A topic to be suggested for discussion by the Soviet delegation.

"Specific topics for discussion at the meetings of the Committee on 9 and 16 July will be communicated by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively not later than one week before each of those meetings.

"As with prior procedural arrangements, this schedule will not preclude any delegation from raising or discussing any subject in any plenary meeting of the Committee. In particular, any delegation may reply at any meeting to statements made at earlier meetings.

(The Chairman, Canada)

"At a later date, the co-Chairmen will develop recommendations concerning the further work of the Committee on measures aimed at reducing the armaments race and at lessening international tensions."

If no representative wishes to make any comment, I take it that the Committee agrees with the recommendation which has been made to it by the co-Chairmen.

It was so agreed.

I believe I should be voicing the views of the members of the Committee other than the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in saying that we are grateful to our co-Chairmen for having arrived at this agenda, which will enable us to conduct our business in a more orderly fashion than hitherto.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, let me welcome, on behalf of my delegation and myself, Ambassador Nehru of India on his return to our Conference. We are very happy to see him here again.

Second, Mr. Chairman -- in conformity with the agreed agenda which you have announced today -- the United States will talk in general about collateral measures. We feel that the most important collateral measures put before this Conference deal with the nuclear arms race. The United States has already presented a broad range of measures in this area; and we have approached the problem by suggesting measures which would both halt the nuclear arms race and reverse it.

As I pointed out in my statement on 9 June (ENDC/PV.188, pp.10 et seq.), our approach to collateral measures is to seek early agreements which would stop the production and the proliferation of more and bigger weapons. In addition, we have developed proposals which would begin to reduce the number of weapons already produced.

In this area of nuclear armaments, we have approached the problem in two different ways. First, we have dealt with the carriers of such weapons. We have proposed a freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). As a means of reducing the numbers of strategic vehicles, the United States has made a proposal for the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 jet bombers (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). Both the strategic vehicle freeze and the jet bomber destruction could be carried out under verification provisions less burdensome than those which would have to accompany general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The second United States approach to the problem of nuclear arms has been to suggest measures which deal with the stockpiles of nuclear explosives themselves. To stop increases in these stockpiles, we have proposed a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapon uses (ENDC/120). This is a logical companion measure for the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle freeze. One measure freezes the number and characteristics of the carriers; the other freezes the amount of fissionable material available for bombs and warheads which are carried.

We have also made a proposal to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear explosives for use in weapons. To this end the United States has proposed the transfer of significant amounts of fissionable material to non-weapon use (ENDC/30/Add.3; ENDC/109).

The nuclear arms race is thus attacked on two fronts. The strategic vehicle freeze and bomber destruction would not only halt the increase but actually begin a decrease in the numbers of delivery vehicles. The cut-off and transfer proposals would not only halt the increase but actually begin a decrease in the size of nuclear stocks on both sides.

Today, within this group of measures, I should like to emphasize the cut-off. We believe that it holds promise; and I say that for two reasons. First, it is in this general area that the most recent steps have been taken by both sides. The announcements by the major nuclear Powers last April of cut-backs in fissionable material production (ENDC/131, 132) do lend weight to our hope that we may be able to take further significant steps. Secondly, the United States approaches negotiations in this area with a great deal of flexibility. In essence, our proposals cover the full range --from the cut-backs which have recently been announced by the three nuclear participants at this Conference, through further plant-by-plant shut-downs with verification, to a complete cut-off with verification. We are thus prepared to consider and accept a wide range of possible alternatives. For that reason we are hopeful that further results can be achieved.

I should now like to review the basic elements of the United States position on a cut-off, some of which have been presented before and some of which have not.

We are prepared to accept a complete, verified cut-off of the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons. We are willing to accept this as a measure separate from and prior to agreement on stage I of general disarmament and the establishment of an international disarmament organization as envisaged in the United States draft treaty outline (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We believe that the verification involved for such a measure could be limited in scope.

We believe that, in addition to nuclear Powers, non-nuclear Powers may wish to accede to a cut-off agreement.

The implementation of a cut-off such as this would have two principal advantages:

First, it would slow the arms race by limiting the quantity of fissionable material available for use in nuclear weapons of all kinds. Fissionable material which could be made into weapons would still be produced as a by-product in reactors designed for electric power production, propulsion or other uses. There is no way to avoid this. But this material would be reserved for peaceful uses under adequate safeguards if the cut-off were adopted; and reactors whose only function was to make fissionable material for weapons would be shut down. The cut-off would thus stop production of the vital explosive ingredient for use in nuclear weapons. It would halt the production of fissionable material for use in the full range of nuclear weapons. This range extends from strategic bombs and warheads to tactical battlefield weapons. It extends from strategic anti-ballistic missiles to various types of shorter-range air defence rockets.

Second, it would help to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons. It would put fixed limits on the amounts of nuclear material available for national nuclear weapons programmes in many areas of the world. It would reinforce the existing incentives against the transfer to other nations of fissionable material for use in weapons.

In our view, a cut-off arrangement should include the following basic undertakings:

First, each party would agree to halt, prohibit and prevent the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, each party would also agree to refrain from rendering assistance to anyone for the purpose of production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Third, each party would agree to accept appropriate inspection.

Fourth, the agreement should contain a withdrawal clause, perhaps one similar to that incorporated in the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1, art.iv). Such a clause would serve to guard against occurrences related to the subject matter of the agreement which might affect adversely the security position of the parties.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

As I pointed out earlier, verification of a cut-off could be relatively limited in scope. It would deal with three kinds of facilities having functions related to the production of fissionable material: (1) those which were declared and completely shut down; (2) those which were declared and continued to produce fissionable material for non-weapon purposes; and (3) those, if any, which were not declared but which might be engaged in clandestine production.

A plant-by-plant shutdown might in the beginning be verified on a plant-by-plant basis. Inspection thus would be even less at the outset than it would be in a complete cut-off.

In August 1962 the United Kingdom delegation submitted an interesting paper (ENDC/60) on the control of fissionable material production in general and complete disarmament. Paragraphs 1 through 26 of that paper deal with control of a cut-off in such circumstances. I can assure representatives that the control provisions which we have in mind for the cut-off as a separable, pre-stage-I measure would be less than those envisaged in that paper for general disarmament. This is true because, as a separable measure, the risk of small diversions of fissionable material by one of the nuclear Powers is less significant than it would be under general disarmament. As the United Kingdom paper makes clear, large hidden nuclear production plants would be difficult to construct and conceal, given limited but sufficient inspection rights to deter such activity.

In future statements we shall explore in more detail the verification provisions of such a cut-off.

In addition to the cut-off, the United States has proposed (ENDC/109) the transfer of significant quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes. Such an arrangement could be taken only in connexion with a cut-off agreement. However, the cut-off agreement itself could be implemented alone.

We have indicated at past meetings that we would consider the transfer of amounts in excess of the originally-proposed figure of 50,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235. We have also indicated that if the Soviet Union felt that the transfer of equal amounts would involve inequities for it, the United States was prepared to consider transferring some reasonable, larger amount than the Soviet Union. As an example of such an arrangement, we have indicated (ENDC/PV.151, p.12) that we would be willing to transfer 60,000 kilograms to the Soviet Union's 40,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I pointed out on 13 February (ENDC/PV.166, p. 18) that this proposal was no mere gesture. Some of the figures on its magnitude are worth repeating. The cost of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is \$720 million. If completely fissioned, it would release about 1,000 megatons of TNT equivalent, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent for every man, woman and child on earth.

The unilateral announcements made in April by the nuclear Powers represented here have put us on the path to the cut-off and the eventual reduction of explosive materials available for nuclear weapons. It is our earnest hope that these steps can be followed with agreements for a complete or partial cessation of production of this material and for meaningful transfers of fissionable material to non-weapon purposes.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before setting forth our proposals on concrete measures aimed at reducing the arms race, I should like on behalf of the Soviet delegation to welcome the representative of India, Mr. R. K. Nehru, and to express the hope that the active participation of the representative of India in our work will help us to make progress in solving the problems of general and complete disarmament, as well as in the field of individual measures for reducing the arms race and easing international tension.

Today the Committee is resuming the consideration of measures aimed at reducing the arms race and lessening international tension. While the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament is the main task of the Committee, there can be no question of the great importance of coming to terms on individual measures that would slow and limit the dangerous and costly arms race, contribute to the strengthening of confidence in relations between States, and help the peoples to draw nearer to the desired goal: a world without arms and without wars.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

These two tasks may be said to complement each other. It is true that some time ago attempts were made by certain Powers to set individual disarmament measures -- or, rather, individual measures of control over disarmament -- in opposition to the task of general and complete disarmament, to substitute them for that task, or at least to relegate it to the background. Nevertheless, thanks to the persistent efforts of the advocates of disarmament, the situation has now changed.

Today everyone recognizes that the problem of general and complete disarmament must be given priority. At the same time, there has emerged a more realistic approach to measures aimed at reducing the arms race.

At the present time, States may be said to have acquired some practical experience in reaching agreement on individual measures aimed at reducing international tension. In the past year alone a number of important measures have been taken by States in this direction, which have had a very positive effect on international relations. From the military point of view the agreements achieved in the past year, even though they have not put a stop to the arms race, have nevertheless succeeded in limiting it to some extent. They have shown in a visible and tangible way that the endless growth, accumulation and improvement of the nuclear arsenals of States are not an inevitable destiny for mankind.

Thus the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) has considerably reduced the possibilities for improving nuclear weapons. The agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117) has barred the way to any extension of the nuclear arms race to outer space. The cut-back by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in the production of fissionable materials, (ENDC/131, 132) that necessary element for the production of atomic and hydrogen bombs which reduce everything living or inanimate to ashes, shows that the nuclear Powers are facing up to the prospect of progressively diminishing the rate of expansion of their nuclear potentials.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

With regard to the reduction of military budgets, carried out unilaterally by a number of States following the initiative of the Soviet Union, it should be noted that this action has given rise to a new trend in present-day international life: the so-called "policy of mutual example". The gist of this policy is that on the basis of a certain mutual confidence, without concluding any formal agreement, States carry out concurrently or consecutively measures aimed at reducing the arms race which are of a unilateral nature but more or less equivalent in their importance.

Thus it is no longer in a void that measures aimed at reducing the arms race and at lessening international tension can be considered in the Committee. The first bricks have already been laid. It is for us to build up the edifice, to continue the peaceful offensive against military bases and testing grounds, military budgets and arsenals.

What path has now to be taken in order to achieve this objective? The Soviet Government gave its answer to this question in the well-known memorandum on measures for slowing the armaments race and relaxing international tension which was issued on 28 January 1964 as an official Conference document (ENDC/123). That document contains a whole programme of measures aimed not only at intensifying the incipient process of improving the international climate, but also at substantially reducing the race for nuclear and other arms, thus preparing the way for the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

In the nuclear field we propose the following measures:

An agreement on prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons;

The elimination of bomber aircraft as one of the basic means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets;

The establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world;

The prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

The implementation of each of these measures separately or all of them together would put a strong curb on nuclear weapons. The conclusion of an agreement to prevent

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the further spread of nuclear weapons would bar access to these weapons by States which do not at present possess them but which are striving to get hold of them for purposes having nothing to do with the maintenance of peace. It is obvious that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should close every loop-hole for such States; otherwise it would only create among the nations a dangerous illusion of security.

In this connexion we should like to re-affirm that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is incompatible with plans for giving West German revenge-seekers access to such weapons through a NATO multilateral nuclear force. It would be just as senseless to build an edifice of peace and at the same time undermine it. Recently a joint communiqué of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic stated quite definitely in this regard:

"Opening the way for the West German militarists -- through a NATO multilateral nuclear force -- to the possession of nuclear weapons ... would drive the world towards a new armaments race and increase tension in international relations."

One of the most important tasks is to avert such a danger; and if the Eighteen-Nation Committee were to shirk fulfilling that task, it would forfeit even the right to be called a Committee on Disarmament.

The other proposal of the Soviet Government -- on the elimination of bomber aircraft -- is designed to exclude from national arsenals at first at least one category of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Of course, bombers nowadays are no longer the most powerful or the most effective type of means of delivery; intercontinental and other ballistic missiles have pushed them into the background to some extent. But bombers are still a powerful weapon, and their destruction would mean a vital measure of actual or, as it is called, physical disarmament. Let this be a beginning; apparently it is easier to begin with bombers than with missiles. Furthermore, people remember that the first and, fortunately so far, the only atomic

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

bombs that have ever been dropped -- those that hurtled down on the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- were dropped by bombers. People will be deeply grateful to us if here in the Committee we work out an agreement on the complete elimination of bombers.

In the course of the Committee's work the Soviet delegation will state its views on how and in what order we consider it most advisable, taking into account the opinions of other delegations, to carry out the elimination of bomber aircraft. At present we should merely like to say that in this regard the Soviet Union intends to adopt a flexible position.

We attach great importance to our proposal for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. As you know, many States in various continents have expressed themselves in favour of the implementation of this proposal. Thus, in the joint communiqué on the negotiations between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, and the President of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Gamal Abel Nasser, it was stated:

"Both sides attach great importance to the establishment of denuclearized zones in Central and Northern Europe, Africa, Asia, the Near and Middle East, in the Mediterranean area, and in other parts of the world through the conclusion of appropriate international agreements."

The establishment of denuclearized zones would exclude vast areas, large groups of States, and whole continents from the sphere of location of nuclear weapons. This would bring great relief to the nations and would free hundreds of millions of people from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

Lastly, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests would put a definite end to the process of improving nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government welcomes with understanding and sympathy the statements in this regard which have been made in the Committee by the representatives of the non-aligned States. It has declared and reaffirms its readiness to reach immediate agreement on the prohibition of all

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

underground nuclear tests on the only reasonable and realistic basis: that control over this prohibition should be carried out by national means for the detection of nuclear explosions. In this regard the Soviet Government calls for co-operation and joint action by all the States in the world. Recently the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, proposed to the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ikeda, that an appeal be made to the Governments of the nuclear Powers for the immediate cessation of underground nuclear tests.

That is the gist and meaning of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union to limit and slow the nuclear arms race. Alongside these measures we have put forward proposals relating to the non-nuclear field. The memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123) contains proposals for reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

With regard to the reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States, the Soviet Union has already set a good example and, as has been announced by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, has begun a further reduction of its armed forces. It would be desirable to reach agreement in the Committee that other States should take similar steps and that the good example set by the Soviet Union should give rise, in this field also, to a policy of mutual example.

We are convinced -- and we are not alone -- that a matter of particular urgency is the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. As we see from what is happening in South Viet-Nam, South Arabia, Cyprus and a number of other areas of the world, the presence of foreign troops and the existence of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries create a serious threat to the security of the peoples and to universal peace. Each month, each year, the problem of getting rid of the presence of foreign troops in the European States, where the armed forces and armaments of the NATO countries on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries on the other, are concentrated in large numbers, becomes ever more acute and urgent.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In proposing a radical solution to the problem of the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, the Soviet Government is willing, if the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution, to agree that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, so as afterwards to lead up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal within the boundaries of their national territories.

The memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 28 January 1964 also contains a number of proposals directly aimed at reducing the threat of a new war and at further strengthening confidence between States, thus creating more favourable political preconditions for the implementation of disarmament.

Among these measures an important place is given to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77). This proposal has been widely supported in the countries of Europe; its great importance has been stressed even by States situated in other continents. The time has come to discuss this proposal in a businesslike manner and to arrive at a mutually-acceptable decision. We are also placed under obligation to do so by the joint communiqué of 25 July 1963 issued by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/101).

It is no secret to members of the Committee that the principal opponent of such a non-aggression pact is one of the NATO States -- Western Germany. There is no secret either about the motives which induce the West German Government to anathematize the very idea of a non-aggression pact. But the question arises, by what should one be guided in settling the question of such a pact? Should one be guided by the designs of leaders of Western Germany who, like the notorious Minister Seehofer, declare more and more openly that they are anxious for revenge, or by the interests of the peoples who are longing for permanent peace in Europe? The harsh lessons of European history give the answer to that question.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Lastly, there is another measure - the reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent. That we have not spoken of this measure until now is by no means due to its being less important than those already mentioned. Indeed, it is a very effective, very important measure which could lead to a substantial slowing of the arms race. As we understand, our proposal for a reduction of the military budgets of States is supported by most of the members of the Committee; this, of course, is gratifying to us and gives rise to hope for progress in this matter.

In order to facilitate still further a positive solution of the problem of reducing military budgets, and after analysing the verbatim records of the discussions on this subject which took place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee from January to April 1964, the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that, for countries possessing a small military potential, it would be difficult to agree at present to a considerable reduction of their military budgets. In this connexion the Soviet Government has instructed us to inform you that our proposal for a reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent does not envisage that all States, great and small, must necessarily reduce their budgets in equal proportions. In the practical solution of this problem, it will be possible to take into account the peculiarities of the situation of this or that State. Obviously the countries to start reduction of military budgets should be those that have the greatest military importance and have large military budgets.

The Soviet Government, which is constantly endeavouring to give all possible support to the developing countries, which are faced with great tasks in order to strengthen their national economies, has also taken into consideration other views of the non-aligned countries which have been expressed by their representatives in this Committee - in particular the view that a part of the resources saved by reducing military budgets should be devoted to rendering assistance to the developing countries. We have been instructed to announce that the Soviet Government is prepared, when agreement is reached on a reciprocal reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent, to agree that a certain portion of the resources thus saved should be devoted to rendering assistance to the developing countries.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In submitting its programme of measures aimed at reducing the arms race and at lessening international tension, the Soviet Government intends, of course, to pay at the same time the greatest attention to the proposals of other States directed towards the same objective; it is anxious to support and help to put into practice all useful proposals.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the new proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland for a freeze on nuclear armaments in Central Europe (ENDC/PV.189, p.6), and considers that its implementation would help towards reducing tension and strengthening security in this area, where a particularly dangerous situation exists at the present time.

We fully support the proposal of the German Democratic Republic for the conclusion of a treaty between the two German States on the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons. That proposal was put forward in January 1964 in a letter from the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Walter Ulbricht, to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Ludwig Erhard (ENDC/124, p.3). We are also in favour of the earliest possible implementation of the new proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, dated 26 May 1964, in which a further attempt is made to induce the West German Government to renounce nuclear weapons.

In view of the negative attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the conclusion of a treaty on this subject between the two German States, the Government of the German Democratic Republic, as members of the Committee are aware, has expressed its readiness to agree that each of the German States should independently make a statement declaring that it renounces the production and testing of nuclear weapons as well as the acquisition of such weapons and any stationing of them in its territory. We call upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to consider with all due attention this new peaceful proposal of the German Democratic Republic, which was set forth in the letter, dated 11 June 1964, from Mr. Otto Winzer, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, addressed to the co-Chairmen of the Committee and circulated at our request as an official document of the Committee (ENDC/133).

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Now let us imagine what the world would be like if the measures proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union and the governments of other socialist States in order to reduce the arms race and lessening international tension were carried out. Of course, it would not yet be a disarmed world: the problem of general and complete disarmament would still have to be solved. But it would unquestionably be a better world. Any possibility of the multiplication of nuclear weapons would be destroyed; in vast areas, occupied by many States, zones would be established in which there would be no place for nuclear weapons and which would be safeguarded against their use; bombers, those terrible means of delivering nuclear bombs to their targets, would disappear from the arsenals of States; all nuclear tests would be stopped. The armed forces of States would be less numerous; neither a single foreign soldier nor a single foreign military base would remain in any country. As a result of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, mutual suspicion between the militarily strongest States would be considerably diminished. Having concluded an agreement to reduce military budgets, States would spend less of their resources on the production of means for destroying human beings, and the resources thus saved could be abundantly devoted to peaceful development.

Yes, it would be a better world than that in which we are now living, although the world of today is already somewhat better than that of yesterday. It is necessary and possible to go forward. It is precisely here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that measures acceptable to all the parties concerned for reducing the arms race and lessening international tension can be worked out and agreed upon.

How, then, should we set about solving this problem? How should we organize our work in this direction? Representatives of many States have spoken here about the need to draw up an agenda for the discussion of measures aimed at reducing the arms race and at lessening international tension. They have pointed out that previous discussion of these measures has been too much in the nature of a general debate and not sufficiently organized. They have expressed themselves in favour of selecting for thorough study in the first place a few measures on which there are the greatest chances of reaching agreement. We fully agree with that point of view.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The question of the order of consideration at our meetings of measures aimed at reducing the arms race and at lessening international tension has been discussed at several meetings between the co-Chairmen of the Committee. The exchange of views on this subject between ourselves and the United States side has resulted, as was announced by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, at the beginning of today's meeting, in an agreement that, starting with the next meeting, the Committee may begin the consideration of specific issues.

The Soviet delegation proposes for discussion as a matter of priority the question of reducing military budgets, which, as the whole course of the discussion in the Committee has shown, elicits wide interest and is apparently one of the most promising from the point of view of the possibility of its being solved in the very near future. The participants in the negotiations are now informed about the order of discussion during the coming week of questions relating to measures aimed at reducing the arms race, among which, after one more meeting, the attention of the Committee will be given to the important and urgent question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, which has been put forward for consideration by agreement between the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States. Later the Committee will consider other important questions which have been mentioned today.

Thus we have reached agreement on procedure. That is necessary, and a good thing. But that by itself does not solve anything. We must search for effective solutions to the problems facing the Committee. The Soviet delegation will do so in the weeks ahead with the utmost perseverance, and hope for success.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 191st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador E.L.M. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representative of the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 23 June 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.